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CRIMINAL LAW-PERFECTING THE IMPERFECT RIGHT
OF SELF-DEFENSE-State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 279 S.E.2d
570 (1981).
INTRODUCTION
Recently the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed the
issue of the availability of the imperfect right of self-defense in
homicide cases.1 Legal commentators throughout the years have
distinguished between a privilege which is perfect and one which is
imperfect, although the writers have not used these labels consist-
ently.2 Today, courts apply the label "perfect" if self-defense, hav-
ing resulted in homicide, entitles the defendant to an acquittal;
and "imperfect" if the defense merely reduces the grade of the of-
fense to manslaughter.8
In State v. Norris,4 the Supreme Court of North Carolina reaf-
firmed the imperfect right of self-defense in North Carolina and
clarified its meaning. The Court ordered a new trial because the
jury instructions seemingly required the jury to find the existence
of all the four elements of the perfect right of self-defense before
the defendant could derive any benefit from the principles of self-
defense. The instructions, given erroneously, deprived the defen-
dant of the benefits of the imperfect right of self-defense.' In the
unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Huskins, the Court concluded
that the perfect and imperfect rights of self-defense are separate
defenses in North Carolina; if either right is applicable, it must be
afforded every defendant who can derive any benefit from the crit-
ical distinction between perfect and imperfect self-defense.
Although Norris does not address directly the issue of denial
of due process, the Court ordered a new trial for the defendant
because the error in the instructions on self-defense may have
1. State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 279 S.E.2d 570 (1981).
2. See R. PERKINS, CmaNAL LAW 1013 et seq. (2d ed. 1969), citing LAMNAR,
EIEENARCHA 248 (4th ed. 1599); 3 CoKR, IrsTrrurrs *55; 1 HALE, P.C. *481; 1
HAWK, P.C. c.28, §§ 21, 24 (6th ed. 1788); FosTER, CROWN LAw 273 (3d ed. 1809);
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARES 180, 183-84; 1 EAST, P.C. 271-72, 279 (1803).
3. State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 244 S.E.2d 397 (1978); State v. Watson, 287
N.C. 147, 214 S.E.2d 85 (1975); State v. Crisp, 170 N.C. 785, 87 S.E. 511 (1916).
4. 303 N.C. 526, 279 S.E.2d 570 (1981).
5. Id. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
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caused the jury to convict the defendant of murder instead of vol-
untary manslaughter. 6 "The chief purpose of a proper charge is to
give a clear instruction which applies the law to the evidence in
such a manner as to assist the jury in understanding the case and
in reaching a correct verdict." Because the instructions given con-
stituted prejudicial error, the implication arises that the trial court
infringed on specific guarantees of fairness, which may have vio-
lated the defendant's due process rights.8
This note will chart the historical development of the imper-
fect right of self-defense and will emphasize the relevant differ-
ences between the perfect and imperfect right of self-defense. By
analyzing how other states have implemented the imperfect right
of self-defense, this note will indicate how North Carolina trial
courts should proceed in implementing this imperfect defense as a
result of the Norris decision. Some constitutional implications of
the opinion are discussed to provide some insight into the signifi-
cance of this decision for future trial practice in North Carolina.
THE CASE
On January 20, 1980, the deceased, Donald Norris, while mar-
ried to the defendant Elsie Norris, was living with Bernice Owens.9
About eight o'clock that night, the defendant went to the trailer
where her husband and Owens were living, knocked and unsuccess-
fully tried to enter. At six o'clock the next morning, Donald Norris
opened the door to see if the defendant had left the premises. The
defendant was waiting in her automobile outside the trailer. About
6:30 the deceased went outside the trailer to catch his ride to work.
The State's evidence tended to show that the defendant shot Don-
ald Norris as soon as he exited the trailer.
The defendant's evidence tended to show that when Donald
Norris exited the trailer, the defendant got out of her car, met
Norris on the passenger side and told the deceased she wanted to
talk to him because she was out of money. The deceased then
cursed the defendant, threatened her, and struck her in the nose
with his fists, breaking her nose and knocking her to the ground. A
medical examination later that day verified the defendant's nose
was broken. The defendant rose from the ground and saw Bernice
6. Id. at 532, 279 S.E.2d at 574.
7. State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971).
8. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
9. 303 N.C. at 527, 279 S.E.2d at 571.
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Owens coming out of the trailer. The defendant had a pistol in her
automobile. She reached in the car and grabbed the pistol as Don-
ald Norris came at her. The defendant feared her husband would
kill her, and that if the deceased and his girlfriend attacked her,
she would not survive. The defendant contended she shot the de-
ceased out of fear for her safety.
At trial, the judge instructed the jury it could find the defen-
dant guilty of murder in the first degree, or murder in the second
degree, or voluntary manslaughter, or not guilty.'0 The trial judge
instructed the jury that to convict the defendant of first degree
murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, among
other things, that the defendant intentionally and "without justifi-
cation or excuse," and with malice, shot Donald Norris with a
deadly weapon."' The judge then defined "without justification or
excuse" by stating, "Members of the jury, when I say without justi-
fication or excuse, I have reference to self-defense, which will be
fully explained hereafter."1" While the quotation appears in that
part of the charge dealing with the various elements of murder in
the first degree, the expression "without justification or excuse"
was used as the equivalent of self-defense throughout the charge,
not only with respect to murder in the first degree, but also with
respect to murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaugh-
ter.13 The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree. Upon the jury's recommendation, the defendant received a
life sentence.' 4
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred
in its charge on self-defense. The Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina concluded that the trial judge added one confusing and erro-
neous sentence to his charge which led the jury to believe that the
phrase "without justification or excuse," an essential element of
murder, was the equivalent of self-defense throughout the charge,
not only with respect to murder in the first degree, but also murder
in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter. 5 The Court
10. Record, State v. Norris, Buncombe Superior Court, Buncombe County, at
172.
11. 303 N.C. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 527, 279 S.E.2d at 571.
15. Id. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573. The confusing sentence was, "Members of
the jury when I say without justification or excuse, I have reference to self-de-
fense, which will be fully explained hereafter."
1982]
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held this portion of the charge was in error, because the instruc-
tions as given seemingly required the jury to find the existence of
all the four elements of the perfect right of self-defense before the
defendant could derive any benefit from the principles of self-de-
fense. 6 The Court held this error and required a new trial.7
BACKGROUND
Courts apply the label "perfect" to the right of self-defense if
the defense, having resulted in homicide, entitles the defendant to
an acquittal, and "imperfect" if the defense merely reduces the
grade of the offense to manslaughter."8 To fully understand the in-
tricacies of the issue presented in Norris, a brief analysis of the
elements of homicide, the lesser included offenses, and the ele-
ments of the perfect right of self-defense is in order.
Murder in the first degree is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice and with premeditation and deliberation.'9 Mur-
der in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice, but without premeditation and deliberation." Volun-
tary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice and without premeditation and deliberation." For example,
a killing resulting from the excessive use of force in the exercise of
self-defense is manslaughter. 2 Involuntary manslaughter is the un-
lawful killing of a human being without malice, without premedita-
tion and deliberation, and without the intention to kill or inflict
16. Id. The four elements of the perfect right of self-defense are: (1) that it
appeared to the defendant and he believed it to be necessary to kill the deceased
in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm; (2) that the defendant's
belief was reasonable, in that the circumstances as they appeared to the defen-
dant were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary
firmness; (3) that the defendant was not the aggressor in bringing on the affray;,
and (4) that the defendant did not use more force than was necessary or reasona-
bly appeared to him to be necessary under the circumstances to protect himself
from death or great bodily harm.
17. Id.
18. State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 244 S.E.2d 397 (1978); State v. Watson, 287
N.C. 147, 214 S.E.2d 85 (1975); State v. Crisp, 170 N.C. 785, 87 S.E. 511.(1916).
19. State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 185 S.E.2d 129 (1971).
20. State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 128 S.F.2d 889 (1963).
21. State v. Benge, 272 N.C. 261, 158 S.E.2d 70 (1967).
22. State v. Woods, 278 N.C. 210, 179 S.E.2d 358 (1971); State v. Marshall,
208 N.C. 127, 179 S.E. 427 (1935); State v. Merrick, 171 N.C. 788, 88 S.E. 501
(1916); State v. Baldwin, 152 N.C. 822, 68 S.E. 148 (1910).
[Vol. 4:427430
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serious bodily injury.23
The perfect right of self-defense excuses a killing altogether if,
at the time of the killing, the four elements were present. First, it
appeared to the defendant and he believed it to be necessary to kill
the deceased in order to save himself from death or great bodily
harm.2' Second, the defendant's belief was reasonable, in that the
circumstances as they appeared to the defendant at the time were
suficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordi-
nary firmness. 5 Third, the defendant was not the aggressor in
bringing on the affray.2' Fourth, the defendant did not use exces-
sive force, i.e., he did not use more force than was necessary or
reasonably appeared to him to be necessary under the circum-
stances to protect himself from death or great bodily harm. 7 The
presence of all four elements gives the defendant a perfect right of
self-defense and requires a verdict of not guilty, not only as to the
charge of murder in the first degree but as to all lesser included
offenses as well.2
If the defendant believed it was necessary to kill the deceased
in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm and if the
defendant's belief was reasonable, but the defendant was the ag-
gressor or he used excessive force, the defendant has only an im-
perfect right of self-defense. 2' Having lost the benefit of perfect
self-defense, the defendant is guilty at least of voluntary
manslaughter."0
Charting the historical content and development of the imper-
fect right of self-defense is helpful in understanding the right.
Reed v. States1 is considered the leading case on the imperfect
23. State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 128 S.E.2d 889 (1963); State v. Honeycutt,
250 N.C. 229, 108 S.E.2d 485 (1959); State v. Satterfield, 198 N.C. 682, 153 S.E.
155 (1930).
24. State v. Deck, 285 N.C. 209, 203 S.E.2d 830 (1974).
25. State v. Ellerbe, 223 N.C. 770, 28 S.E.2d 619 (1944).
26. See State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 180 S.E.2d 135 (1971). A person is con-
sidered to be an aggressor under this rule whenever he has "wrongfully assaulted
or committed a battery upon him or when he has provoked a present difficulty by
language or conduct towards another that is calculated and intended to bring it
about."
27. State v. Woods, 278 N.C. 210, 179 S.E.2d 358 (1971).
28. 303 N.C. at 530, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
29. Id. See also State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 244 S.E.2d 397 (1978).
30. Id.
31. 11 Tex. App. 509 (1882).
4311982]
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right of self-defense,82 the fatal exercise of which does not entitle
the user to an acquittal.83 In Reed, a paramour killed an outraged
husband who caught him in an act of adultery. The defendant's
explanation was that the husband had attacked him and he was
forced to kill to save his own life. Reed's murder conviction was
reversed because the erroneous omission of any instruction on
manslaughter may have denied Reed the benefits of his imperfect
right of self-defense."
The Missouri state courts have had several opportunities to
discuss the concept of the imperfect right of self-defense. In State
v. Partlow,3 the Missouri Supreme Court emphasized the "impor-
tant distinction between one who is at fault in bringing on a quar-
rel with malice aforethought, and one who provokes an encounter
with no intent to kill or injure."86 The following year, the same
court took the sound position that if the defendant started the dif-
ficulty with no intent to cause death or great bodily harm, he was
guilty only of manslaughter.3 7 State v. Gordon" reaffirmed Part-
low; to determine whether the exercise of self-defense was perfect
or imperfect depends upon the intent with which the defendant
brought on the quarrel, or willingly entered therein.89
State v. Crisp,1' a leading North Carolina decision, recognizes
the principle of perfect self-defense, which excuses a homicide al-
together, and imperfect self-defense, which reduces a capital of-
fense to a lesser degree of the crime.4 Crisp is a classic statement
of the doctrine and consequences of the imperfect right of self-
defense:
Tersely stated, it is that, if one takes life, though in the defense of
his own life, in a quarrel which he himself has commenced with
intent to take life or inflict serious bodily harm, the jeopardy in
which he has been placed by the act of his adversary constitutes
no defense whatever, but he is guilty of murder. But, if he com-
32. See R. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 1013.
33. 11 Tex. App. at 512.
34. Id. at 522.
35. 90 Mo. 608, 4 S.W. 14 (1886).
36. Id. at 614, 4 S.W. at 20.
37. State v. Hicks, 92 Mo. 431, 4 S.W. 742 (1887); See R. PJmUNS, supra note
2, at 1015.
38. 191 Mo. 114, 89 S.W. 1025 (1905).
39. Id. at 125, 89 S.W. at 1028.
40. 170 N.C. 785, 87 S.E. 511 (1916).
41. Id. at 792, 87 S.E. at 514.
432 [Vol. 4:427
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menced the quarrel, with no intent to take life or inflict grievous
bodily harm, then he is not acquitted of all responsibility for the
affray which arose from his own act, but his offense is reduced
from murder to manslaughter.'
Crisp quotes with approval the rationale and result of the Reed"
and Partlow" decisions."8
In the more recent case of State v. Potter,4' the appeal was
based upon an alleged error in the jury instructions on self-de-
fense. The Supreme Court of North Carolina identified the four
elements which make up the perfect right of self-defense.47 How-
ever, the Court cautioned that none of the four elements must be
found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, because the State has
the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not act in self-defense."s The Court's caution in Potter is con-
sistent with the landmark decision of Mullaney v. Wilbur," in
which the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that im-
proper jury instructions concerning the placement of burden of
proof violate due process.'" The burden of disproving self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt is upon the government. 51 The require-
42. Id. at 793, 87 S.E. at 515. Accord: Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509 (1882).
The quote is attributable to Cullen, J., People v. Fillipelle, 173 N.Y. 509, 66 N.E.
405 (1903).
43. 11 Tex. App. 509 (1882).
44. 90 Mo. 608, 4 S.W. 14 (1886).
45. 170 N.C. at 793, 87 S.9 at 515.
46. 295 N.C. 126, 244 S.E.2d 397 (1978).
47. See the list of these elements on page five of the text and supra note 16.
48. 295 N.C. at 143, 244 S.F.2d at 408. See also State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C.
632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
49. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
50. Id. at 701-4. The Mullaney Court held that the due process clause re-
quires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the
heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a
homicide case. In the opinion, the Court stated that the requirement of proving a
negative is not unique in our system of criminal jurisprudence. Maine itself re-
quires the prosecution to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Satisfying this burden imposes an obligation that, in all practical effect, is
identical to the burden involved in negating the heat of passion on sudden provo-
cation. By implication, the Court concluded that the Due Process Clause requires
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense
when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case.
51. 421 U.S. 689. See also State v. Hart, 44 N.C. App. 479, 483, 261 S.E.2d
250, 253 (1980), which holds that the "burden of disproving self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt is placed upon the State."
1982] 433
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ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is crucial to our criminal
system for cogent reasons. 2 The accused during a criminal prose-
cution has interests of immense importance at stake, because of
the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by convic-
tion.53 Moreover, use of the reasonable doubt standard is indispen-
sible to command the respect and confidence of the community in
application of our criminal law." Potter concluded that an accused
aggressor, though otherwise acting in self-defense, is guilty at least
of voluntary manslaughter.55 The defendant aggressor loses the
benefit of perfect self-defense."
Potter does not define the imperfect right of self-defense be-
cause, under the facts of that case, the instruction constituted
harmless error. 7 However, the Potter opinion implicitly recognizes
the imperfect right of self-defense." A case with facts similar to
those of Norris was needed to distinguish the perfect from the im-
perfect right of self-defense because the facts squarely raised the
question and the trial judge departed from the pattern jury in-
structions.59 Norris presented the Court a clear opportunity to re-
move confusion from a substantive area of the law and to clarify
jury instructions on self-defense. 60 Because the Supreme Court of
North Carolina ordered a new trial for defendant Norris, the Court
determined that the trial judge had not given a reasonably clear
and accurate statement on the law of self-defense."
The rationale for ordering a new trial if an erroneous instruc-
tion is given is based on the desire of the courts to ensure that
every defendant receives a fair trial.' The provisions of the Bill of
Rights, applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, contain basic guarantees of a fair
trial.63 Due process of law requires that proceedings shall be fair;
52. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 364.
55. 295 N.C. at 144, 244 S.E.2d at 409.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 146, 244 S.E.2d at 410.
58. Id. at 144-46, 244 S.E.2d at 408-10.
59. N.C.P.I. Crim. 206.10 (May, 1980 Replacement).
60. 303 N.C. at 530, 279 S.E.2d at 572-73.
61. See Newman v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 443, 126 S.W. 578 (1910); State v.
Larkin, 250 Mo. 218, 157 S.W. 600 (1913).
62. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
63. Included among these rights is the right to counsel, right to a speedy and
[Vol. 4:427.434
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however, fairness is a relative and not an absolute concept." Ap-
plied to criminal trials, the denial of due process is a "failure to
achieve that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice."'" To declare a denial of due process, the court must find
that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts
complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevent a fair
trial."
The North Carolina Constitution provides the defendant in a
criminal case with guarantees of a fair trial similar to those of the
federal constitution. The state constitution provides that "No per-
son shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by
the law of the land."1 "Law of the land" is equivalent to "due
process of law."" All courtroom procedure must be consistent with
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice.19 Because the in-
structions in Norris constituted prejudicial error, the implication
arises that the trial court may have violated the defendant's due
process rights under both the federal and state constitutions.7
ANALYSIS
In State v. Norris,1 the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in
a unanimous decision, clarified the meaning of the imperfect right
of self-defense in homicide cases in North Carolina. The Court
held that the trial judge erred in his charge, because the instruc-
tions as given seemingly required the jury to find the existence of
all four elements of the perfect right of self-defense before the de-
fendant could derive any benefit from the imperfect right of self-
defense. 2 The trial judge erroneously added one sentence to his
charge which may have led the jury to believe throughout the
charge that the phrase "without justification or excuse," an essen-
tial element of murder, was the equivalent of "self-defense." 7' The
public trial, right to be free from use of unlawfully seized evidence and unlawfully
obtained evidence.
64. Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429 (1943).
65. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
66. Id.
67. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 24.
68. State v. Collins, 169 N.C. 386, 387, 84 S.E. 1049, 1050 (1915).
69. State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N.C. 259, 266, 45 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1947).
70. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
71. 303 N.C. 526, 279 S.E.2d 570 (1981).
72. Id. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
73. Id.
19821 435
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Court held this error required a new trial. "
The rule is well established that the charge of a court must be
read as a whole and is to be construed in the manner in which the
judge presented it to the jury.76 The charge must be construed con-
textually, and isolated portions will not be held prejudicial when
the charge as a whole is correct.7 1 "If the charge presents the law
fairly and clearly to the jury, the fact that some expressions, stand-
ing alone, might be considered erroneous will afford no ground for
reversal."' 7 Because the charge in Norris was erroneous as mea-
sured by the above standards, the trial court did not clearly and
fairly present the correct law of self-defense in homicide cases in
North Carolina. 8
Norris has several implications for proper jury instructions in
future North Carolina murder trials. "The chief purpose of a
proper charge is to give a clear instruction which applies the law to
the evidence so that the jury can understand the case and reach a
correct verdict. '7 9 The trial judge has wide discretion in presenting
the issues to the jury, so long as he charges the applicable princi-
ples of law correctly,"' and states the evidence plainly and fairly
without expressing an opinion as to whether any fact has been
fully or sufficiently proved.81
If the charge contains a full and fair summary of the evidence
and the contentions of the parties, together with an accurate state-
ment and explanation of the applicable principles of law, the de-
fendant's assignment of error to the charge will be overruled.82 "If
there are conflicting instructions upon a material point, a new trial
must be ordered because the jury is not presumed to be able to
distinguish between a correct and an incorrect charge. '183 Trial
courts have a duty to instruct the jury adequately on the law of
self-defense as it applies to the facts of the case.8' An instruction
74. Id. at 532, 279 S.E.2d at 574.
75. State v. Wilson, 176 N.C. 751, 97 S.E. 496 (1918).
76. State v. Cook, 263 N.C. 730, 140 S.E.2d 305 (1965).
77. State v. Hall, 267 N.C. 90, 92, 147 S.E.2d 548, 549 (1966).
78. Id.
79. State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971).
80. State v. Mundy, 265 N.C. 528, 144 S.E.2d 572 (1965).
81. State v. Biggs, 224 N.C. 722, 32 S.E.2d 352 (1944); State v. Howard, 222
N.C. 291, 22 S.E.2d 917 (1942).
82. State v. Yoes, 271 N.C. 616, 157 S.E.2d 386 (1967).
83. State v. Carver, 286 N.C. 179, 183, 209 S.E.2d 785, 788 (1974).
84. Byrd v. State, 142 Ga. 633, 83 S.E. 513 (1914). Evidence, however slight
and however improbable, which would justify an instruction on self-defense, re-
[Vol. 4:427
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on self-defense must be an accurate and reasonably clear state-
ment of the law of self-defense." Because the Supreme Court of
North Carolina ordered a new trial for defendant Norris, the Court
determined that the trial judge had not given a reasonably clear
and accurate statement on the law of self-defense in North
Carolina.
The rationale for ordering a new trial because of an erroneous
instruction is based upon the court's duty to ensure that every de-
fendant receives a fair trial." "Due process of law requires that
proceedings shall be fair."" In addition to due process considera-
tions, the North Carolina Constitution provides that every defen-
dant is entitled to a jury trial in all criminal proceedings." This
constitutional guarantee requires proper jury instructions to be
given in a clear and accurate manner to ensure that the defendant
receives every benefit to which he is entitled.89 Although Norris
does not address the constitutional issue of due process, the Court
ordered a new trial for the defendant because the error in the
charge on self-defense may have caused the jury to convict the de-
fendant of murder rather than of voluntary manslaughter." Be-
cause the Norris instructions constituted prejudicial error, the
Court could have determined that the trial court had failed to pro-
vide that "fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice.' 1
Although the doctrine and consequences of the imperfect right
of self-defense were enunciated as far back of 1916," the Supreme
Court of North Carolina had not made a comprehensive attempt to
set out the elements of the defense until Norris. Reaffirming the
explanation of an earlier decision,"3 the Court stated that the
phrase "without justification or excuse" as an element of murder in
quires that such an instruction be given. See Hardy v. People, 133 Colo. 201, 292
P.2d 973 (1956); State v. Duncan, 86 S.C. 370, 68 S.F. 684 (1910).
85. Newman v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 443, 126 S.W. 578 (1910); State v.
Larkin, 250 Mo. 218, 157 S.W. 600 (1913).
86. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
87. Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429 (1943); Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 116, 118 (1934).
88. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 24.
89. State v. Mundy, 265 N.C. 528, 114 S.E.2d 572 (1965).
90. 303 N.C. at 532, 279 S.E.2d at 574.
91. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
92. State v. Crisp, 170 N.C. 785, 87 S.E. 511 (1916).
93. State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 244 S.E.2d 397 (1978); State v. Baldwin,
152 N.C. 822, 68 S.&_ 148 (1910).
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the first or second degree means the absence of either of the first
two elements of self-defense; i.e., the defendant did not believe it
was necessary to kill the victim to save herself from death or great
bodily harm or her belief under the circumstances as they ap-
peared to her at that time was unreasonable."
The error in the Norris instructions, specifically the trial
court's equating "without justification or excuse" with "self-de-
fense," is that the instructions seemingly required the jury to find
the existence of all four elements of the perfect right of self-de-
fense before the defendant could derive any benefit from the prin-
ciples of self-defense.95 The Court concluded this was prejudicial
error because the charge deprived the defendant of the benefits
flowing from her imperfect right of self-defense should the jury
find that (1) it appeared to her and she believed it was necessary
to kill the deceased in order to save herself from death or great
bodily harm, and (2) her belief was reasonable because the circum-
stances as they appeared to her at the time were sufficient to cre-
ate such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness, but
(3) without the intent to kill Donald Norris or inflict serious bodily
injury upon him, she commenced the quarrel and was the aggres-
sor, or (4) she used more force than was necessary or reasonably
appeared to her to be necessary under the circumstances to protect
herself from death or great bodily harm." Should the jury make
these findings, the defendant would be guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter only.97
Defendant objected to the trial court's failure to charge the
jury on self-defense, both as a perfect and an imperfect defense."
The trial court refused to so charge the jury, apparently believing
that it had adequately addressed the issue within the body of the
charge. Indeed, examining the charge as a whole, the trial court did
present the basic principle when the judge charged:
If the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was otherwise acting in self-defense and used excessive force, or
was the aggressor, though she had no murderous intent when she
entered the fight, the defendant would be guilty of voluntary
94. 303 N.C. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 531-32, 279 S.E.2d at 573-74.
97. Id.
98. Record, State v. Norris, Buncombe Superior Court, Buncombe County at
12
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manslaughter."
The effectiveness of this portion of the charge was diminished be-
cause the judge did not use the label "imperfect self-defense" when
he charged the applicable principles of law. Although Norris does
not make the use of specific labels an absolute requirement, Norris
does make it clear that when a judge does use these labels, he is
giving the jury every opportunity to understand and recognize the
critical distinctions between the separate defenses.'"0
The placement of the phrase "without justification or excuse"
in the Norris charge was problematic because the judge equated
the phrase "without justification or excuse" with self-defense early
in the charge. 101 Many paragraphs later in his charge, the judge
announced the four requisite elements of perfect self-defense. 1"
This irregular placement easily could have misled the jurors into
thinking that anytime the judge used the phrase "without justifica-
tion or excuse," it was synonymous with the term self-defense,
which required the jury to find the existence of all four elements of
the only type of self-defense on which they had been instructed,
before the defendant could derive any benefit from the principles
of self-defense.0 8 Therefore, under this erroneous instruction, the
jury could have found that the defendant had a reasonable belief
in the necessity of the use of force to protect herself and that the
defendant was not the aggressor but that the defendant used ex-
cessive force."z ' Because of the misleading nature of the instruc-
tions, the jury may not have perceived any alternative to finding
the defendant guilty of murder simply because all of the four ele-
ments had not been met.10 5 The jury would have discovered them-
selves in a similar quandry if they had found that the defendant
was the aggressor, but that she had not used excessive force.'" Be-
cause this error in the charge on self-defense in Norris may have
caused the jury to convict the defendant of murder instead of vol-
untary manslaughter, a new trial was required.0 7
99. Id. at 181.
100. 303 N.C. at 530-32, 279 S.E.2d at 572-73.
101. Record, State v. Norris, Buncombe Super. Ct., Buncombe Co., at 177.
102. Id. at 179-80.
103. 303 N.C. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
104. Id. Excessive force means that the defendant used more force than was
necessary to protect himself from death or great bodily harm.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 532, 279 S.E.2d at 574.
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A well settled principle of constitutional law dictates that if a
court can reach a decision on any issue other than a constitutional
one, the court will avoid the constitutional issue.'08 The Norris
court did not base its decision expressly on constitutional princi-
ples because ordering a new trial due to erroneous jury instructions
affords the relief requested without the necessity of deciding a con-
stitutional issue.
Norris raises another constitutional issue which the Court did
not address. The Court did not address the issue of the proper
placement of the burden of proof when self-defense is properly
raised.109 If the evidence tends to indicate that the defendant acted
in self-defense in taking the life of the deceased, the trial court has
the duty to instruct the jury adequately on the law of self-defense
as it is applicable to the facts of the case.110 An instruction on self-
defense must be an accurate and reasonably clear statement of the
law of self-defense.' 1
A trial judge must make the state's burden clear by instructing
the jury that to find malice, it must be convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that the accused did not kill in the exercise of imper-
fect self-defense." 2 When first degree murder is charged and some
evidence of self-defense is offered, the burden is upon the state to
prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt."1 '
The United States Supreme Court, in numerous opinions,114 has
stated that the state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the defendant did not act in self-defense." 5 The Court has
proclaimed that "it is the duty of the government to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion, basic in our law, is a re-
quirement and a safeguard of due process of law."''
If the state fails entirely to carry its burden, a verdict of not
guilty must follow, because self-defense is a complete defense."17 If
108. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally J. No-
WAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 83-85 (1978).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
110. Byrd v. State, 142 Ga. 633, 83 S.E. 513 (1914).
111. Newman v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 443, 126 S.W. 578 (1910).
112. State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 419 A.2d 406 (1980).
113. State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 651, 220 S.E.2d 575, 582 (1975).
114. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Le-
land v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952).
115. Id.
116. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952).
117. State v. Ramey, 273 N.C. 325, 330, 150 S.E.2d 56 (1968); State v. Street,
[Vol. 4:427440
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the state fails to carry its burden of showing the absence of appre-
hension on the part of the defendant of death or serious bodily
harm at the hands of the person slain, or having failed on that
point, that such apprehension was not reasonable and no murder-
ous intent is shown, the offense is no greater than manslaughter. 1 8
A thorough reading of the entire Norris charge"O indicates that the
trial court did not charge the jury that it should not find the de-
fendant guilty of first degree murder if the State had failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of at least one of the
first two elements of self-defense, i.e., the necessity of the act and
the reasonableness of the belief.
In Norris, the trial court defined "without justification or ex-
cuse" as "self-defense which will be fully explained hereafter. 1 20
The trial court did not tell the jury that the phrase "without jus-
tificaton or excuse," when used in the definition of first degree
murder related only to the first two elements of self-defense, i.e.,
necessity and reasonableness of the belief.1 21 The trial court failed
to inform the jury of the judicial interpretation of "without justifi-
cation or excuse." When charging on self-defense in North Caro-
lina, the trial judge must correctly define the term self-defense. 22
The Norris charge did not clearly and properly place the burden of
proof on the prosecution to prove that the defendant did not act in
self-defense.128
The trial court also charged that if the jury did not find the
defendant guilty of first degree murder, the jury "must" determine
whether the defendant was guilty of any lesser included offenses.12 4
The trial court did not condition its mandate upon a jury determi-
nation that the State had proved the absence of self-defense be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The mandate was erroneous because it
failed to treat self-defense as a complete defense." 5 The instruc-
tion may have led the jury to erroneously conclude that self-de-
fense was not a complete defense to any offense charged or lesser
241 N.C. 689, 693, 86 S.E.2d 277 (1955).
118. State v. Crisp, 170 N.C. 785, 87 S.E. 511 (1916); State v. Watson, 287
N.C. 147, 214 S.E.2d 85 (1975).
119. Record, State v. Norris, Buncombe Super. Ct., Buncombe Co., at 171-86.
120. 303 N.C. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
121. Id.
122. State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519, 180 S.E.2d 135, 138 (1971).
123. See State v. Hart, 44 N.C. App. 479, 261 S.E.2d 250 (1980).
124. Record, State v. Norris, Buncombe Super. Ct., Buncombe Co., at 181.
125. See State v. Ramey, 273 N.C. 325, 150 S.E.2d 56 (1968).
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included offense.
The trial court followed prior practice when it instructed the
jury as it did. The trial judge followed the North Carolina Pattern
Jury Instructions'2 verbatim in his charge, except that he added
to his charge one confusing sentence not present in the pattern in-
structions. The sentence added equated "without justification or
excuse" with "self-defense." The Supreme Court of North Carolina
held the addition of this sentence constituted prejudicial error.127
Norris should provide the trial courts with new guidance in han-
dling the sensitive area of jury instructions.
At the least, Norris stands as a warning to trial judges to en-
sure that the distinction between the perfect and imperfect right of
self-defense is not overlooked or underemphasized in their jury in-
structions. Other state courts have taken a more progressive view
than Norris towards implementing the imperfect right of self-de-
fense in homicide cases. The Supreme Court of New Jersey re-
cently noted that if a self-defense instruction is appropriate in a
prosecution for murder, an instruction on imperfect self-defense
and manslaughter is necessarily appropriate as well. 128 The ratio-
nale for the New Jersey rule is that if a trial court decides the
evidence is sufficient to warrant charging the jury on self-defense,
the court should conclude that the very same evidence could be
used to support an imperfect self-defense charge. 2 9 Although Nor-
ris does not explicitly impose such a requirement on the North
Carolina trial courts, the distinctions between the defenses could
be emphasized more clearly by providing the jury with separate
instructions and qualifications on each defense. To appropriately
raise the issue of imperfect self-defense, the defendant need only
show the slightest amount of evidence to justify this instruction.130
If the facts of a case indicate the possibility that the killing is
manslaughter based upon an imperfect exercise of self-defense,
there is no reason why the trial judge should not be obliged, even
without a request being made, to charge on the imperfect right of
self-defense. 1 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court questioned
whether it is proper for the trial court to omit such a charge simply
because defense counsel requests that it not be given, even if the
126. N.C.P.I. Crim. 206.10 (May, 1980).
127. 303 N.C. at 532, 279 S.E.2d at 574.
128. State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 310, 419 A.2d 406, 412 n.12 (1980).
129. Id. at 310, 419 A.2d at 413.
130. People v. Hall, 25 Ill. App. 922, 324 N.E.2d 50, 57 (1975).
131. State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 310, 419 A.2d 406, 412 n.12 (1980).
[Vol. 4:427
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prosecutor concurs in that request. 3 Powell indicates public pol-
icy demands a charge of imperfect self-defense should be afforded
every defendant even in the absence of any request. 83 Norris does
not require defense counsel to request an imperfect self-defense
charge because the defendant is entitled "to the benefits flowing
from her imperfect right of self-defense."'" No mention is made
in Norris that defense counsel must specifically request an imper-
fect self-defense charge in order for the defendant to avail herself
of the benefits of imperfect self-defense.
To justify an instruction on self-defense, the defendant's use
of his evidence to support a manslaughter instruction based upon
imperfect self-defense need only be plausible.'" Therefore, when-
ever any plausible evidence is presented justifying a self-defense
instruction, an instruction on perfect and imperfect self-defense is
required.'" There is no basis for differentiating between perfect
and imperfect self-defense because the same evidence that caused
the trial judge to instruct on perfect self-defense justifies an in-
struction on an unreasonable exercise of self-defense, i.e., imper-
fect self-defense.13 7 Although the language in Norris is not as ex-
plicit as the language in Powell, Norris does require that the
defendant receive all the benefits of the imperfect right of self-de-
fense.1 8 For the defendant to receive the benefits of imperfect self-
defense, the jury must be correctly charged on the elements of the
imperfect right of self-defense. Only when the trial judge presents
the jury with a correct analysis of both types of defense can the
defendant be assured of receiving every benefit to which he is
entitled.189
Jurors must have a clear understanding of the relevant differ-
ences between the perfect and imperfect right of self-defense so
that they can make an informed decison when choosing between a
murder or a manslaughter verdict.1, 0 At least one state court, in
conjunction with its State Bar Committee, has implemented a sep-
arate jury instruction for the benefit of any defendant who claims
132. Id. at 310, 419 A.2d at 413.
133. Id.
134. 303 N.C. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
135. State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 310, 419 A.2d 406, 412 n.12 (1980).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 303 N.C. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
139. Id. at 532, 279 S.E.2d at 574.
140. Id. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 574.
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imperfect self-defense. " ' That instruction makes careful use of the
label "imperfect" so the jury will be able to contrast that instruc-
tion with the instruction for the "perfect" right of self-defense.
Under this practice, a defendant is entitled to an instruction ap-
plying the imperfect right of self-defense to those who provoke or
bring on the difficulty unlawfully or wrongfully. 4" The North Car-
olina Pattern Jury Instructions do not reflect, as of this writing,
the new requirement of clarifying the imperfect right of self-de-
fense. The applicable instructions on first degree murder, which
the trial judge used in Norris, were replaced in May, 1980," a year
before Norris."4 Norris implies that the pattern jury instructions
should be reworded to reflect the relevant differences between the
perfect and imperfect right of self-defense in a clear and unconfus-
ing manner." 5
The federal courts have recognized that "competent" counsel
would investigate the possibility of manslaughter on a theory of
imperfect self-defense. 1" Although a defendant may have been un-
reasonable in using deadly force in self-defense, his right to imper-
fect self-defense, upon proper jury instructions, may justify no
more than a manslaughter conviction." 7
Other states have gone beyond the dictates of Norris. The
manslaughter provisions of two of the latest comprehensive crimi-
141. State v. Sanders, 49 Mo. Ct. App. 693, 694, 556 S.W.2d 75, 76 (1977).
This innovative instruction reads as follows:
A person charged with murder is entitled to be acquitted of murder and
to have the grade of the homicide reduced to manslaughter on the
ground of imperfect self defense if the defendant wrongfully and unlaw-
fully, but without felonious intent to kill or do serious bodily harm pro-
voked the use or threat of force against himself at the time of the killing,
and if thereafter he had reasonable cause to believe and did believe that
it was necessary to take the life of his adversary in order to protect him-
self from such danger.
142. Id.
143. The previous first degree murder instruction also did not contain a ref-
erence to the imperfect right of self-defense. Although Norris does not explicitly
require that the instruction be reworked, the gist of the decision is that the pre-
sent instructions do not clearly reflect the state of the law when imperfect self-
defense is properly asserted. By charging appropriately on both of these separate
defenses, the defendant will then receive every benefit to which he is entitled
flowing from his imperfect right of self-defense.
144. Norris was decided in July, 1981.
145. 303 N.C. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
146. Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 132 (1977).
147. Id.
[Vol. 4:427
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nal codes, those of Illinois148 and Wisconsin, ' 9 recognize the exis-
tence of the imperfect right of self-defense in their statutory provi-
sions on voluntary manslaughter. These recent state codifications
indicate a progressive trend toward the effective implementation of
the imperfect right of self-defense. The North Carolina statutes do
not, as yet, reflect this progressive trend. 5 0 Norris should provide
some much needed guidance in this critical area of the law of self-
defense and help to ensure that every defendant receives the
benefits flowing from the principles of self-defense to which he is
entitled. 151
CONCLUSION
Norris clarifies the existence of the imperfect right of self-de-
fense in homicide cases in North Carolina. The trial court in a
homicide prosecution erred in using the expression "without justi-
fication or excuse" as the equivalent of "self-defense" throughout
the charge. The instructions seemingly required the jury to find
the existence of all four elements which make up the defendant's
perfect right of self-defense before she could derive any benefit
from the principles of self-defense. The instructions erroneously
deprived the defendant of the benefits flowing from her imperfect
right of self-defense should the jury find that (1) it appeared to her
and she believed it was necessary to kill the deceased in order to
save herself from death or great bodily harm, and (2) her belief
was reasonable because the circumstances as they appeared to her
at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a
person of ordinary firmness, but (3) without the intent to kill the
deceased or inflict serious bodily harm upon him, she commenced
the quarrel and was the aggressor, or (4) she used more force than
148. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, § 9-2 (Cum. Supp. 1979):
Voluntary Manslaughter: (b) A person who intentionally or knowingly
kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the
killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed,
would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Arti-
cle 6 of this Code (self-defense), but his belief is unreasonable.
149. WIs. STAT. § 940.05 (Cune. Supp. 1979):
Manslaughter: Whoever causes the death of another human being under
any of the following circumstances may be imprisoned not more than ten
years: . . . (2) Unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self-
defense.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-18 (1979).
151. 303 N.C. at 531, 279 S.E.2d at 573.
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was necessary or reasonably appeared necessary under the circum-
stances to protect herself from death or great bodily harm. If the
facts indicate the possibility that the crime was manslaughter
based upon imperfect self-defense, the trial judge is required, even
without any request being made by the defense attorney, to in-
struct the jury on imperfect self-defense. The burden is now upon
trial judges to see that jurors understand the critical distinction
between the perfect and imperfect right of self-defense in order to
ensure that a defendant receives every benefit of the imperfect
right of self-defense to which he is entitled.
Richard Charles Blanks
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